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The paper discusses Peano’s argument for preserving familiar notations. The
argument reinforces the principle of permanence, articulated in the early 19th
century by Peacock, then adjusted by Hankel and adopted by many others.
Typically regarded as a principle of theoretical rationality, permanence was un-
derstood by Peano, following Mach, and against Schubert, as a principle of
practical rationality. The paper considers how permanence, thus understood,
was used in justifying Burali-Forti and Marcolongo’s notation for vectorial calcu-
lus, and in rejecting Frege’s logical notation, and closes by considering Hahn’s
revival of Peano’s argument against Pringsheim’ reading of permanence as a
logically necessary principle.
Der Beitrag diskutiert Peanos Argument fu¨r die Bewahrung vertrauter No-
tationen. Es geht um das Prinzip der Permanenz, das im fru¨hen 19. Jahrhun-
dert von Peacock artikuliert, dann von Hankel angepasst und von vielen an-
deren u¨bernommen wurde. Wa¨hrend es im allgemeinen als ein Prinzip der the-
oretischen Rationalita¨t betrachtet wurde, interpretierte Peano es anknu¨pfend
an Mach und gerichtet gegen Schubert als ein Prinzip der praktischen Ratio-
nalita¨t. Der Beitrag untersucht, wie Permanenz, so verstanden, von Burali-Forti
und Marcolongo zur Rechtfertigung von Bezeichnungen in der Vektorrechnung
verwendet wurde und zur Zuru¨ckweisung der logischen Notation Freges fu¨hrte.
Die Arbeit schließt mit einer Ero¨rterung der Wiederbelebung des Peanoschen
Arguments in Hahns Kritik von Pringsheims Interpretation der Permanenz als
ein logisch notwendiges Prinzip.
Keywords: principle of permanence; notation; Peano and Schubert; Burali-
Forti and Marcolongo; Schro¨der and Frege; Pringsheim and Hahn
1 Introduction
Should familiar notation be preserved in science? Should one continue to use
the symbols used in already established theories? And should one commit to
preserving the properties these symbols possess in such theories? The history
of science does not seem to provide a definite answer, as indicated on the one
hand by the existence of alternative notations for one and the same theory,
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and on the other hand by unequivocal attempts to increase the uniformity of
notation across theories. In this paper, I discuss an argument in favor of the
preservation of familiar notation in logic and mathematics, explicitly advocated
as such, early in the 20th century, by Giuseppe Peano.
Peano’s argument reinforces a rather different understanding of the princi-
ple of permanence than that articulated in the first part of the 19th century
by George Peacock and then adjusted and advocated by Hermann Hankel, and
subsequently adopted by many other mathematicians and philosophers of math-
ematics. While they took it to be a principle of theoretical rationality, i.e., one
that, albeit not universally valid, is nevertheless indispensable for the devel-
opment of mathematics as a genuine science, the principle of permanence was
understood by Peano, following Mach, as a principle of practical rationality.
More specifically, it was understood to justify the preservation of familiar nota-
tion in science, as illustrated by Cesare Burali-Forti and Roberto Marcolongo’s
notational project for vectorial calculus. By contrast, Peano regarded Frege’s
innovative notation for logic as an obstruction or an injunction against perma-
nence thus understood. As will become clear, one salient difference between
these two conceptions of the principle of permanence is that, while as a prin-
ciple of theoretical rationality it was applied to the basic laws and rules of a
mathematical theory, as a principle of practical rationality it was applied more
generally to ideas and relations (of which the basic laws and rules of mathe-
matical theories are but a subset), as well as to their notational expressions.
Another related difference concerns the goals motivating the application of the
principle of permanence: preservation of basic laws and rules was motivated by
the goal of rendering an extension of a mathematical theory as meaningful as
the theory undergoing the extension, while preservation of familiar ideas and
notations was motivated by the ideal of thought economy.
Is Peano’s conception of the principle of permanence justified? What exactly
did he find problematic with its understanding as a principle of theoretical ra-
tionality? What made him adopt an alternative conception, and why exactly
did he associate this with the Italian project for vectorial calculus? What made
Peano think that Frege’s logical diagrams interfere with the principle of perma-
nence, specifically understood as a principle of practical rationality? Finally, is
the principle of permanence, thus understood, sufficient to eliminate all arbi-
trariness in the development of new theories?
The paper will proceed as follows. In section two, I recall some of the rel-
evant historical background to the principle of permanence, spanning almost a
century, from the 1820s to the 1910s, including an exchange between Augustus
De Morgan and Ada Lovelace, so far underexplored. This will provide evidence
that not everybody understood this principle in the same way: some thought it
was a methodological principle, some others a metaphysical one; some took it to
represent an indispensable foundation for science, some others a necessary truth
that could be assumed in mathematical proofs. Yet others, like Mach, consid-
ered the principle of permanence a matter of practical rationality, meant (just
like logical consistency) to improve thought economy and reduce intellectual
discomfort. In section three, after briefly describing the view of permanence
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defended by Hermann Schubert, along with the criticism that Frege stormed
against it, I reconstruct Peano’s argument, also directed against Schubert, for
the claim that permanence could be regarded only as a principle of practical
rationality. Then I consider what Peano took to be an illustration of the prin-
ciple, thus understood, in the notational project initiated by Burali-Forti and
Marcolongo, where it was specifically meant to facilitate the dissemination and
assimilation of vectorial calculus.
Peano’s conception of permanence implies that the introduction of a new no-
tation in science, which fails to preserve relevant properties of familiar notations
already in use, would be costly from a practical point of view. Of course, what
would be the relevant properties that ought to be preserved, and the practical
costs for failing to do so, is to be determined in each particular case. But for
vectorial calculus, which will be here discussed, the claim was that the larger the
variety of notations in use, the more difficult the dissemination and the assimi-
lation of the calculus. For another case in point, I discuss in section four Peano’s
earlier rejection of the two-dimensional notation that Frege had introduced in
his Begriffsschrift. As is well known, Frege’s sweeping criticism of formalism
repudiated what he took to be Hankel’s formalism and, together with this, the
principle of permanence as an indispensable foundation for formal mathematics.
But Frege’s dispute over notation with Peano (and Schro¨der) indicates that he
rejected the principle of permanence as a practical concern as well. It also indi-
cates that at least some of their criticisms of the Begriffsschrift were not simply
based on misunderstanding its innovative character and its higher standards of
rigor, but were also motivated (perhaps more explicitly in Peano’s case) by a
conception of permanence as a principle of practical rationality.
Despite their opposite character relative to the principle of permanence, both
Frege’s and Burali-Forti and Marcolongo’s notational projects failed. Moreover,
Schubert’s understanding of permanence as a principle of theoretical rationality
not only survived Peano’s criticism, but in fact received purportedly stronger
support, such as in the works of Alfred Pringsheim. This led in turn to a reitera-
tion of Peano’s criticism, by Hans Hahn, which I discuss in section five. Against
Pringsheim’s insistence on permanence as a principle that allows no choice as to
the rules to be preserved when extending a number system, Hahn argued that
even if permanence were a logically necessary principle, arbitrariness would still
creep in, since the principle of permanence cannot rule out the possibility of
distinct extensions of a number system. In order to eliminate this arbitrari-
ness, he maintained that a further condition is required to guarantee extension
uniqueness. As we will see, Hahn goes beyond Peano by arguing that in order
to solve this problem of arbitrariness in the extension of number systems, what
is needed, beside permanence, is the stipulation that equality must be uniquely
defined in the extended system, which in turn requires that its basic operations
be conceived as one-to-one mappings. He also noted, however, that practical
considerations might also help sometimes to choose between distinct extensions.
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2 The Principle of Permanence
Implicit mention of what would come to be known as the principle of permanence
can be found early in the 19th Century, for example in Johann Peter Wilhelm
Stein’s 1828 Elemente der Algebra: “One of the most important difficulties
that calculating with numbers has to overcome is that it is to establish rules
for those new cases in calculation which are as much as possible in agreement
with the customary arithmetical rules and still properly well founded. [...] Of
the rules of arithmetic, which have indeed been proven for all possible number
values of letters, but also only for number values, one has to wish that they
were also right if the letters occurring in them, all or partially, meant zero or
negative quantities.”1 Thus, Stein thought that although one must preserve the
rules of the arithmetic of positive natural numbers when extending the range of
computations to include, e.g., negative natural numbers, the new rules for an
extended system of numbers must be in agreement with the old ones “as much
as possible”. This suggests that, on Stein’s view, the new rules must be either
identical to the old ones, or, if different, must be at least consistent with them,
and raises a question as to how much disagreement with the old rules may be
allowed such that one may still call the new rules “properly well founded.” As
we will see in section three, a similar question would come up in relation to later
expressions of the principle of permanence, critically discussed by Peano.
An explicit formulation of the principle of permanence appears in George
Peacock’s 1833 “Report on the recent progress and present state of certain
branches of analysis”, where it is expressed in the following way: “Whatever
form is algebraically equivalent to another when expressed in general symbols,
must continue to be equivalent, whatever those symbols denote.” This “Prin-
ciple of Permanence of Equivalent Forms”, as Peacock called it, also stipulates
the following: “Whatever equivalent form is discoverable in arithmetical algebra
considered as the science of suggestion, when the symbols are general in their
form, though specific in their value, will continue to be an equivalent form when
the symbols are general in their nature as well as in their form.”2 For example, if
m, n and a denote any integers, as they do in what Peacock called arithmetical
algebra, then it is the case that ma + na = (m + n)a. Arithmetically equiva-
lent forms like this one are said to have a “necessary” existence (Peacock 1833,
199), for they are true in virtue of the definitions of the basic operations (like
addition and multiplication). Permanence demands that ma + na = (m + n)a
remains an equivalent form in what Peacock called symbolic algebra, where m,
n and a may denote anything whatsoever. However, as a symbolically equiv-
alent form, ma + na = (m + n)a cannot be true in virtue of the definitions
of the operations, since in symbolic algebra no such definitions are yet avail-
1English translation quoted from Schubring (2005, 514, my emphasis). For discussion of
the principle of permanence, see e.g. Koppelman (1971), Pycior (1997), Fisch (1999), and
Detlefsen (2005). As a general rule for this paper, I give my own English translations in the
text only if they are not already available, and quote the original versions in footnotes.
2See Peacock (1833, 198sq, my emphasis). These same formulations are repeated in Pea-
cock’s two-volume Treatise on Algebra (Peacock 1842-1845).
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able. The meaning of the basic operations is only determined by symbolically
equivalent forms like ma + na = (m + n)a. Such forms are thus said to have a
“conventional” existence (Peacock 1833, 200).
One of Peacock’s main concerns was the applicability of symbolic algebra. He
noted that although the rules of symbolic algebra, i.e., a certain set of symbol-
ically equivalent forms, can be used for deducing other symbolically equivalent
forms, i.e., the theorems of symbolic algebra, this would be a mere game with
meaningless symbols if the forms had no applications, that is, if they had only
a conventional existence. Thus, Peacock required that symbolically equivalent
forms permit an arithmetical interpretation, i.e., that they can always be trans-
ferred back to arithmetical algebra, such that they can also have a necessary
existence as arithmetically equivalent forms. Another of Peacock’s main con-
cerns was the generality of the principle or permanence. As stated above, the
principle requires that all arithmetically equivalent forms should be preserved
in symbolic algebra, and vice versa, all symbolically equivalent forms should be
transferable back to arithmetical algebra. But Peacock knew very well that some
arithmetically equivalent forms are essentially connected to the specific values
of symbols, such that they cannot be preserved in symbolic algebra. Some
arithmetically equivalent forms are, therefore, only hypothetically preserved in
symbolic algebra, in the sense that as symbolically equivalent forms they have
only a “hypothetical” existence (Peacock 1833, 210): they always “degenerate”
into arithmetically equivalent forms that hold for some specific numerical values
of their symbols. Due to such cases, Peacock recommended caution in the use
of the principle of permanence. Despite such limitations of its generality, he
conceived of it as a principle of theoretical rationality. That is, he thought that
permanence, just like logical consistency, was indispensable to the development
of symbolic algebra as a genuine science: the idea that equivalent forms are to
be preserved “must guide” this development. Thus, albeit not universally valid,
permanence was taken to be a methodologically necessary principle. Peacock
implied that, without taking permanence as our guide, we would end up with a
set of arbitrary equivalent forms, with no application and no meaning whatso-
ever. That, he thought, would hardly be deserving of the name of science.
An arguably similar conception of permanence was later defended by Her-
mann Hankel in his 1867 book, Vorlesungen u¨ber die complexen Zahlen und ihre
Functionen. His development of purely formal theories of numbers, disconnected
from intuition and constrained only by the conditions of logical consistency and
mutual independence of its rules, was to be similarly guarded against poten-
tial meaninglessness. To this effect, Hankel required that the formal rules for
the operations with what he called objects of thought (Gedankendinge) admit
as their subordinate the non-formal rules for the operations with quantities as
objects of intuition, e.g., the rules of arithmetic. This requirement was meant
to ensure that the statements of his formal theories would always have a non-
formal, arithmetical interpretation and, thus, applicability. Hankel wrote: “Any
attempt to treat the irrational numbers formally and without the concept of
quantity must lead to extremely abstruse and laborious artificialities that, even
if they can be carried out with complete rigor, which we have good reason to
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doubt, do not have a higher scientific value. Because in general it is a matter of
systematic science to get clear on and be aware of the true foundations of the
natural development of ideas, but not to want to replace the organism with its
always fresh production power by a lifeless and unproductive mechanism, even
if ingeniously constructed.”3 Hankel would later be criticized for imposing such
a requirement on formal theories. Alfred Pringsheim, for example, to whom I
shall return below in section five, commented on the passage just quoted: “It
appears extremely remarkable that even the creator of a purely formal theory
of rational numbers has shown so little understanding for the corresponding
further development of the number concept.”4
Hankel gave the principle of permanence the following formulation: “If two
forms expressed in general signs of the universal arithmetic are equal to one an-
other, they should remain equal if the signs cease to denote simple quantities and
the operations thereby receive some different content as well.”5 This corresponds
roughly to Peacock’s formulation of the principle: ma + na = (m + n)a, as an
arithmetical expression of equal forms should be preserved in formal mathemat-
ics, where m, n and a may denote any objects of thought and ma+na = (m+n)a
is taken as a formal expression. Hankel thought that permanence was not a mere
guide or a merely heuristic (hodegetische) principle; rather, he claimed that it
was indispensable, for he thought that it was a “metaphysical” principle (1867,
12). However, Hankel also clearly warned against an incautious universal appli-
cation of the principle, pointing out that in developing formal theories, certain
rules or laws that hold for the real numbers cannot be extended to complex and
hypercomplex numbers. Furthermore, he proved that there can exist no exten-
sion beyond the complex numbers that preserves the commutativity of basic
operations (Detlefsen 2005, 286).
Peacock and Hankel converged, I think, on the point that the principle of per-
manence, although not universally valid, is to be understood as an indispensable
guide for the development of symbolic algebra and of formal number theories,
that is, as a principle of theoretical rationality, primarily meant to guarantee the
arithmetical interpretability of such theories, and thus to justify the claim that
3“Jeder Versuch, die irrationalen Zahlen formal und ohne den Begriff der Gro¨sse zu behan-
deln, muss auf ho¨chst abstruse und beschwerliche Ku¨nsteleien fu¨hren, die, selbst wenn sie sich
in vollkommener Strenge durchfu¨hren liessen, wie wir gerechten Grund haben zu bezweifeln,
einen ho¨heren wissenschftlichen Wert nicht haben. Denn u¨berall ist es Sache der systema-
tischen Wissenschaft, sich der wahren Grundlagen der natu¨rlichen Entwickelung der Ideen
klar und bewusst zu werden, nicht aber den Organismus mit seiner immer frischen Produc-
tionskraft durch einen, wenn auch scharfsinnig construirten, doch todten und unproductiven
Mechanismus ersetzen zu wollen.” (Hankel 1867, 46sq)
4“Es erscheint a¨usserst merkwu¨rdig, dass gerade der Scho¨pfer einer rein formalen Theorie
der Rationalzahlen fu¨r die entsprechende Weiterbildung des Zahlbegriffs so wenig Versta¨ndnis
gezeigt hat.” (Pringsheim 1894, 57, n32) To be clear, the criticism here is not that Hankel
took the principle of permanence to be universally valid, that is, that it did not admit of
any exceptions; rather, Pringsheim’s criticism is that a purely formal theory should not be
constrained by any applicability requirements.
5“Wenn zwei in allgemeinen Zeichen der arithmetica universalis ausgedru¨ckte Formen
einander gleich sind, so sollen sie einander auch gleich bleiben, wenn die Zeichen aufho¨ren,
einfache Gro¨ssen zu bezeichnen, und daher auch die Operationen einen irgend welchen anderen
Inhalt bekommen.” (Hankel 1867, 11)
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they are genuine sciences in their own right, rather than meaningless games.6
But other mathematicians held stronger views about permanence.
Augustus De Morgan, for instance, took the principle of permanence to
be not merely an indispensable guide, but a necessary mathematical truth.
His own formulation of the principle is as follows: “all algebraical expressions
are combined and reduced by rules, which, although derived from notions on
quantity, will produce the same results, if we alter the form of the primitive
expressions in any manner, consistently with the rules, even though the new
forms should no longer admit of being considered as quantities.”7 What De
Morgan seems to say is that the forms of algebraic expressions, which result
from the application of a set of rules to primitive expressions, remain the same,
whether the forms admit of being considered as quantities or not, i.e., no matter
what the expressions denote. He seems to imply that all rules applicable to
expressions the forms of which admit of being taken as quantities are preserved
when the forms to be altered belong to expressions that do not denote quantities
any longer, and so that the principle would be generally applicable.
In correspondence with Ada Lovelace, who had questioned the validity of
this principle, De Morgan insisted on “the necessity of its truth.”8 His use
of the principle of permanence in mathematical proofs, such as his proof of
the binomial theorem, suggests that he attributed to the principle a necessity
stronger than methodological necessity. Unconvinced, Lovelace followed up: “It
cannot help striking me that this extension of Algebra ought to lead to a further
extension similar in nature, to Geometry in Three-Dimensions; & that again
perhaps to a further extension into some unknown region, & so on ad-infinitum
possibly.” (quoted in Hollings et al. 2017, 18) It’s not quite clear what Lovelace
suggested here, and whether she thought that a potentially infinite succession
of extensions “similar in nature” was problematic, and if so, why. But one can
speculate that she might have meant that, if the principle of permanence is
considered a necessary and universally valid truth, then all possible extensions
of a given mathematical system would be essentially the same. This might have
been what she found “striking”. If this is what she meant, then she anticipated
an intuition that, as we will see in the next section, played an important part in
Peano’s argument against permanence as a principle of theoretical rationality.
In any case, De Morgan’s understanding of the principle of permanence was
much closer to Peacock’s than was the view later advanced by Mach, who saw
6For a different reading of Hankel relative to Peacock, see Peckhaus (1997).
7De Morgan (1836-1842, 119), quoted in Hollings et al. (2017, 18). De Morgan also
formulated the principle of permanence as follows: “When an algebraical multiplication, or
other operation, such as has hitherto been defined, can be proved to produce a certain result in
cases where the letters stand for whole numbers, then the same result must be true when the
letters stand for fractions, or incommensurable numbers, and also when they are negative.”
(1837, 212, quoted in Hollings et al. 2017, 17)
8Quoted in Hollings et al. (2017, 18). De Morgan’s full reaction to Lovelace’s skepticism
was the following: “This principle requires some algebraical practice to see the necessity of
its truth.” (The Lovelace Byron Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Box 170, Transcripts of
Folios 1-179, by Christopher Hollings. Available on the Clay Mathematics Institute’s website:
https://claymath.org)
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it as a matter of practical, rather than theoretical rationality. In his 1905
book Knowledge and Error, he described a view of permanence as yet another
handmaid of thought economy: “The mutual adaptation of thoughts is not ex-
hausted in the removal of contradictions: whatever divides attention or burdens
the memory by excessive variety, is felt as uncomfortable, even when there are
no contradictions left. The mind feels relieved whenever the new and unknown is
recognized as a combination of the known, or the seemingly different is revealed
as the same, or the number of sufficient leading ideas is reduced and they are ar-
ranged according to the principles of permanence and sufficient differentiation.
Economizing, harmonizing and organizing of thoughts are felt as a biological
need far beyond the demand for logical consistency.” (Mach 1905, 127sq) Mach
understood the principle of permanence as a principle of practical rationality,
subordinate to his general principle of thought economy, in the same manner
in which he conceived of consistency: together, they were meant to achieve the
supreme goal of mutual adaptation of thoughts (including the adaptation of
thoughts to facts). The special job of permanence was to eliminate, as much as
possible, the intellectual discomfort caused by loading our memory and divid-
ing our attention through new ideas. But although Mach may have taken it to
be applicable in all generality to ideas, the principle or permanence was more
specifically to be applied to “leading ideas”. Commenting on Mach’s view of
laws as the leading ideas that economically order our experiences, Musil took
such ideas to “correspond to the need for permanence” and justified this claim
in the following way: “For it is in them – in constant laws and equations [...]
that thought seeks to grasp those ideas which can be held on to permanently
whatever individual changes may occur.” (Musil 1908, 24) Thus, the princi-
ple of permanence, although it could be generally applied to ideas, was to be
applied more particularly to laws and equations, and as such it was supposed
to eliminate (or reduce) intellectual discomfort not only by preserving old and
familiar laws, but also by seeing that new laws, which could not be seen as
combinations of the old ones, are avoided as much as possible.9
To better understand Mach’s view of permanence, it may be helpful to con-
sider it as against a Peircean conception of the nature of inquiry. As is well
known, Peirce defended a view according to which inquiry, and in particular
scientific inquiry, lacks proper motivation in the absence of logical inconsis-
tency. He famously wrote: “That the settlement of opinion is the sole end of
inquiry is a very important proposition. It sweeps away, at once, various vague
and erroneous conceptions of proof. Some people seem to love to argue a point
after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made.
When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it
did go on, it would be without a purpose.” (Peirce 1877, 11) Purposeful mental
action and, thus, proper scientific inquiry requires the presence of “real and
living” (as opposed to mere Cartesian) doubt, which arises only when logical
inconsistencies are revealed. This doubt stimulates the mind to seek the settle-
9For a discussion of Mach’s conception of the principle of permanence as a thought-
economical principle, and his dispute with Husserl on the matter, see Toader (2019).
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ment of belief. Once inconsistency is removed, stimulation ceases, belief settles,
and inquiry should stop. To postpone settlement, which is what Peirce thought
was characteristic of Cartesian epistemology, is a “perversity.” (Peirce 1878,
39) But to seek improvement after belief has settled would be no less irrational.
Still, this is precisely what Mach seems to think one should seek: as we have just
seen, he thought that getting rid of logical inconsistencies, and thus reaching a
Peircean settlement of belief, would never be the end of any inquiry, as it may
not be enough for reaching intellectual comfort. What Mach further required is
that old ideas, laws and equations, be preserved as much as possible, and that
new ideas, laws and equations, irreducible to the old ones, be avoided as much
as possible. Only if this extra two-fold requirement were satisfied, could one
fully achieve a mutual adaptation of thoughts.
3 Peano’s Argument
Before we analyze Peano’s argument about the principle of permanence, we
should briefly discuss Schubert’s conception of permanence as a principle of
theoretical rationality, for this is what Peano reacted to. Schubert contributed to
the very first volume of the Encyklopa¨die der mathematischen Wissenschaften, a
joint editorial project of the academies of sciences in Go¨ttingen, Leipzig, Munich,
and Vienna. Citing both Peacock and Hankel, Schubert invoked the principle of
permanence or, as he also sometimes called it, the principle of exceptionlessness
(Ausnahmslosigkeit), each time a new extension of the system of positive natural
numbers was introduced. His formulation of it has four parts: “1. to give to
each concatenation of signs, which represents no previously defined number,
such a sense that the concatenation can be manipulated after the same rules
as if it represented one of the previously defined numbers; 2. to define such
a concatenation as a number in an extended sense of the word, and thereby
to extend the concept of number; 3. to prove that for the numbers in the
extended sense, the same propositions hold as for the numbers in the not yet
extended sense; 4. to define what equal, greater than, and less than, mean in the
extended number domain.”10 Although the relations between these four parts
are never clarified, the same formulation is given again in Schubert’s 1899 book,
Elementare Arithmetik und Algebra. What is quite clear, however, at least from
the first and the third part of the principle, is that he thought that all rules
that govern a non-extended number system must govern the extended system
as well, and furthermore, that all propositions that hold in the non-extended
system must provably hold in the extended one as well.
10“[D]as Prinzip der Permanenz [...] in viererlei besteht: erstens darin, jeder Zeichen-
Verknu¨pfung, die keine der bis dahin definierten Zahlen darstellt, einen solchen Sinn zu
erteilen, dass die Verknu¨pfung nach denselben Regeln behandelt werden darf, als stellte sie
eine der bis dahin definierten Zahlen dar; zweitens darin, eine solche Verknu¨pfung als Zahl
im erweiterten Sinne des Wortes zu definieren und dadurch den Begriff der Zahl zu erweitern;
drittens darin, zu beweisen, dass fu¨r die Zahlen im erweiterten Sinne dieselben Sa¨tze gelten,
wie fu¨r die Zahlen im noch nicht erweiterten Sinne; viertens darin, zu definieren, was im
erweiterten Zahlengebiet gleich, gro¨sser und kleiner heisst.” (Schubert 1898, 11)
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Not everybody agreed that this was clear enough, though. Schubert’s con-
tribution to the Encyklopa¨die was reviewed by Frege, whose discussion of it
is a prime example of the kind of contempt and derision that he was capable
of spewing at some of his colleagues (Frege 1899). It may also be considered
a prime example of the kind of hurried and unfair reading that Frege gave to
some texts. For example, he read into Schubert’s first part of the principle the
idea that the rules follow from the sense of the signs, although Schubert does
not actually say that; rather, what he said is that the application of the rules
requires that the signs have a sense. Frege then argued that to believe that the
propositions which hold for the new numbers are identical to the propositions
that hold for the old ones because the rules for the manipulations of the new
number-signs are identical to the rules for the manipulations of the old number-
signs proves that Schubert confused numbers with their signs, which on Frege’s
view was of course a fatal sin. However, as already mentioned, Schubert unfor-
tunately never clarified the relations between the four parts of his statement of
the principle of permanence, and in particular between the first and the third
one, so it is not clear that he actually believed what was attributed to him.
Thus, it’s not clear that Schubert was as much of a sinner as Frege took him to
be. More importantly, I think that this is indicative of Frege’s attitude towards
permanence as a principle of theoretical rationality. In the next section, fur-
ther below, after briefly recalling his evisceration of Hankel, I will discuss what
Frege seems to have thought of permanence, as Peano understood it, i.e., as a
principle of practical rationality.
Unlike Frege, and a decade after, Peano directed his criticism of the principle
of permanence solely at the third part of Schubert’s formulation:11
This principle of permanence reached its apogee with Schubert, who,
in the Encyklopa¨die der mathematischen Wissenschaften, affirmed
that one must “prove that for the numbers in the extended sense,
the same propositions hold as for the numbers in the not yet ex-
tended sense.” Now, if all the propositions which are valid for the
entities of one category are valid also for those of a second, then
the two categories are identical. Hence — if this could be proved
— the fractional numbers are integers! In the French edition of the
Encyklope´die these things are put to rights. There it says that one
must be “guided by a concern for keeping the formal laws as much
as possible.” Thus the principle of permanence acquires the value of
a principle, not of logic, but of practice, and is of the greatest im-
portance in the selection of notation. Basing their work on precisely
this principle — a particular case of what Mach called the principle
of economy of thought — Professors Burali-Forti and Marcolongo
succeeded in untangling the disordered skein of notations in vecto-
rial calculus, where all used to be arbitrary (and many still believe
that the notations are necessarily arbitrary). (Peano 1910, 225)
11Peano translated Schubert’s full formulation of the principle in an earlier paper, written
in his simplified Latin (Peano 1903).
10
The argument presented here by Peano could be initially reconstructed as
follows: (P1) It is not the case that all propositions that are true in an extended
system are provably true in the non-extended one. (P2) Hence, only the formal
laws of the non-extended system must be preserved as much as possible in the
extended one. (P3) Thus, the principle of permanence is not a logical one, but
only a principle of practice. (P4) Burali-Forti and Marcolongo interpreted it in
precisely this way in their notational project for the vectorial calculus.
I will briefly consider the project mentioned in (P4) further below. For now,
however, let us try to clarify Peano’s argument. The first premise (P1) appears
to have been justified by the following reductio: if all propositions that hold
in an extended system provably hold in the non-extended system as well, then
the two number systems would be identical, which would be a contradiction
(for it would obviously deny the assumption that an extension is different than
the non-extended system). But even if one accepted this justification for (P1),
it’s not clear how (P2) would follow; it’s not clear, that is, how it would follow
that the formal laws of the non-extended system must be preserved as much as
possible, rather than completely, in the extended system (Detlefsen 2005, 287).
For it is of course possible that although some propositions that hold in the
extended system are not true in the non-extended one, the formal laws of the
non-extended system are all preserved. This, however, might not be how Peano
intended his argument. For it’s not clear that he intended (P2) to follow from
(P1), that he intended the qualified version of the principle to follow from the
rejection of the unqualified one. Indeed, he might have considered (P1) and
(P2) as strictly unconnected, corresponding to distinct stages in Schubert’s own
formulation of permanence. If so, then Peano’s argument could be reconstructed
as follows: (P1’) The formal laws of the non-extended system must be preserved
as much as possible. (P2’) Thus, the principle of permanence is not a logical one,
but only a principle of practice. (P3’) Burali-Forti and Marcolongo interpreted
it in precisely this way in their notational project for the vectorial calculus.
Drawing on Peano’s reading of the French translation of Schubert’s contribu-
tion, the justification for (P1’) most plausibly stems from views on permanence
such as those we have already seen articulated by Stein, even before Peacock
and Hankel. Such views were sensitive to the fact that, in some cases, one has
no choice but to forgo some formal laws when extending a number system. In-
ferring from this that permanence cannot be a logical principle, as stated by
(P2’), Peano clearly meant that (P1’) was sufficient to reject views like De Mor-
gan’s, who understood the principle of permanence as a necessary truth, which
can be justifiably used in proofs. But did Peano also mean to reject Peacock’s
and Hankel’s views about it, as an indispensable guide for the development of
mathematics? I think that he did, to the extent that there is no precise account
of what “as much as possible” means in (P1’). For this seems to allow that the
choice as to what formal laws to preserve, and what to forgo, is logically arbi-
trary, in the sense that more than one option is logically possible. But then one
can, at least in principle, choose not to preserve any formal laws whatsoever,
and postulate instead entirely new ones. This renders permanence dispensable,
insofar as one could develop, say, a new theory of numbers independently of
11
any available theories of numbers. But instead of dismissing such a theory as
meaningless and unscientific, like Peacock and Hankel would have done, Peano
thought that it should be rejected because its development would have a high
practical cost: its dissemination and assimilation would require a tremendous
intellectual effort. He also thought that embracing the principle of permanence
could help avoid this cost. This is why he adopted a Machian conception of
permanence, to replace what he took to be a defective conception of it as a
principle of theoretical rationality.
Thus understood by Peano, permanence was considered useful, for example,
in justifying various attempts to make notations more uniform across science. He
expressed this idea in an early version of his famous 1921 paper on definitions in
mathematics: “Another practical law that governs mathematical definitions and
notations is the so-called principle of permanence, or principle of conservation of
the formal laws. This principle requires that when establishing a new system of
notations, or a new calculus, it is convenient to do it such that the new calculus
be similar as much as possible with old calculi, so that the student does not have
to learn a whole new calculus, but only the differences from the theory known
to him. This principle corresponds to the principle of the economy of thought,
and of minimum work.”12 Peano thought that this conception of permanence
was suitably illustrated by Burali-Forti and Marcolongo’s notational project for
vectorial calculus. We will briefly describe this project below, and then explain
why Peano also believed that Frege’s logical notation went against the principle
of permanence.
4 Permanence and Notation
On Peano’s conception of the principle of permanence, the existence of a plural-
ity of notations for the same theory, as well as the proposal of a new notation
that fail to preserve some (or any) characteristics of familiar notations already
in use, would be regarded as a major drawback from a practical point of view.
Peano thought that one should want to avoid this, and as we will presently see,
this is at least part of the reason why he rejected Frege’s notation for logic, and
also part of the reason why he strongly supported Burali-Forti and Marcolongo’s
notational project for vectorial calculus. Let us start with the latter.
In the first decade of the 20th century, there existed many different nota-
tions in use for even the basic or fundamental notions of the vectorial calculus,
sometimes within the works of the same mathematician. Among Italian mathe-
maticians, in particular, this state of affairs was perceived as “anarchical” (Sal-
12“Un altra legge pratica che regge le definizioni e le notazioni matematiche, e` il cosi detto
principio di permanenza, o principio di conservazione delle leggi formali. Questo principio
impone che quando si stabilisce un nuovo sistema di notazioni, o un nuovo calcolo, conviene
fare in modo che il nuovo calcolo sia simile per quanto e` possibile ai calcoli antichi, sicche`
lo studioso non debba imparare tutto un nuovo calcolo, ma solo le differenze colla teoria a
lui nota. Questo principio corrisponde al principio dell’economia del pensiero, e del minimo
lavoro.” (Peano 1911, 69, my emphasis) The English translation of Peano (1921), included in
Peano (1973), does not contain this passage.
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lent Del Colombo 2010, 514), which motivated the need to find a “unique and
universal” notation. In their 1909 book, Burali-Forti and Marcolongo deplored
the fact that Hamilton used different combinations of symbols for denoting vec-
tors, e.g., “B–A” and then “AB” for a vector from point A to point B. They
further noted that others used different symbols for vectors: “The AB notation
does not agree with the simple notation used by Grassmann for the geometric
formations [...] of which the vectors are a special case.” But more importantly,
they continued, Hamilton’s notation “destroys the analogy with algebraic calcu-
lus, that is, it is contrary to the useful principle of permanence.”13 Burali-Forti
and Marcolongo considered the analogy between the vectorial and the algebraic
calculus as a consequence, or a particular expression, of the principle of perma-
nence. They also thought that a notation for vectorial calculus that was meant
to be unique and universal must be in agreement, as far as possible, with the
notations already developed for that calculus.
The two requirements for what Burali-Forti and Marcolongo thought would
be a successful development of their project may, therefore, be summarized as
follows: “1) the notations (at least the fundamental ones) must not be in con-
tradiction with those (also fundamental ones) of Mo¨bius, Hamilton, Grassmann
[...]; 2) the vector algorithm must be established in such a way as to deviate
as little as possible from the universally known algorithm of algebra, because
respecting the laws of permanence and economy greatly facilitates the dissem-
ination of the vectorial calculus.”14 These requirements are further articulated
and justified in a series of articles published in Rendiconti del Circolo Matem-
atico di Palermo, where Burali-Forti and Marcolongo chose to present their
project in detail. Upon the publication of the articles, a debate on their pro-
posed notation ensued in L’Enseignement Mathe´matique, which included among
the contributors Felix Klein, who was rather skeptical that the project would
succeed, and Peano, who defended it wholeheartedly. Nevertheless, the project
ended up by failing to meet everyone’s standards. The American mathematician
Edwin Bidwell Wilson — a former student of Gibbs at Yale — concluded for
example that “there is no apparent gain in uniformity of notations attributable
to these Italian activities.” (Wilson 1913, 525)
Peano’s reasons for defending Burali-Forti and Marcolongo’s project, and
for endorsing their use of the principle of permanence in justifying the project,
brings to light some neglected aspects of his criticism of Frege’s innovative no-
tation for modern logic. These aspects concern the conspicuous differences be-
13“La notazione AB non e` d’accordo con la notazione semplice usata da Grassmann per le
formazioni geometriche [...] delle quali i vettori sono un caso particolare. Distrugge la analogia
con il calcolo algebrico, cioe` e` contraria all’utile princ`ıpio di permane`nza.” (Burali-Forti and
Marcolongo 1909, 240)
14“1) le notazioni (almeno le fondamentali) non devono essere in contraddizione con quelle
(pure fondamentali) di Mo¨bius, Hamilton, Grassmann, perche´, anche avuto riguardo al sistema
vettoriale minimo occorrente in pratica, non pare lecito ipotecare il passato e l’avvenire delle
grandi opere di quei grandi; 2) l’algoritmo vettoriale deve essere stabilito in modo da discostarsi
il meno possibile da quello universalmente noto dell’algebra, perche´ rispettando le leggi di
permanenza e di economia si facilita grandemente la diffusione del calcolo vettoriale.” (Sallent
Del Colombo 2010, 515sq, my emphasis)
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tween Frege’s notation and the notations already in use by most logicians, in
particular Boole and his followers, but also its perceived disanalogy with calculi
developed elsewhere in mathematics, in particular in arithmetic. But before we
consider Peano’s and Frege’s different attitudes towards permanence as a prin-
ciple of practical rationality, we should note Frege’s misgivings with Hankel’s
view of permanence as a principle of theoretical rationality.
Frege’s reading of Hankel, just like his review of Schubert’s Encyklopa¨die
contribution, seems to have been unfortunately rather inaccurate, but this did
not stop him from dismissing most of what Hankel did as a mathematician, and
treating it like “a rhetorically useful attack-target-quote generating machine.”
(Tappenden 2019, 238sq) For example, just like he would later do against Schu-
bert, Frege blamed Hankel for allegedly committing the fatal sin of confusing
numbers with their signs, when formally extending the system of positive nat-
ural numbers to include the negative ones. As mere symbols drawn on paper,
without any content, the signs for negative numbers can have physical proper-
ties, but no arithmetical properties. Thus, Hankel’s formal extension is really no
arithmetical extension. But as we have seen above, Hankel argued, like Peacock,
that all formal extensions of natural numbers must be capable of arithmetical
interpretation, and he took the principle of permanence to guarantee such an
interpretation, thereby showing that formal extensions are meaningful, rather
than mere symbols, without any arithmetical content. Frege’s criticism suggests
that he doubted that Hankel’s argument, along with his view of the principle of
permanence, could be defended.
Frege seems to have thought in a similar manner about Peano’s conception
of permanence as a principle of practical rationality. It is well known that Peano
criticized Frege’s logical notation, introduced in the Begriffsschrift, as deficient
overall: from a scientific point of view, as he promptly noted in a review of the
first volume of Frege’s Grundgesetze, “the [Formulario] system amounts to a
more penetrating analysis. And then from the practical viewpoint, by using a
composite sign to represent logical multiplication, Frege obscures its commuta-
tive and associative properties.” (Peano 1895, 30) The criticism implies that a
new notation must be such that these properties are not only preserved, but at
least as perspicuous as in other already established notations. The “composite”
signs for disjunction and conjunction, as constructed by Frege from the signs
for implication and negation, triggered Peano’s genuine concern that they could
(as they in fact did) incur a practical cost, both with regard to the dissemina-
tion and the assimilation of Frege’s logical calculus. Peano further contended
that, unlike Frege’s notation, the one adopted in his Formulario is “identical
with those of Schro¨der and Peirce” (Peano 1895, 30), and added also that the
deviation from Boole’s notation is rather minimal and insignificant.15 One can
15Schro¨der disagreed and criticized Peano’s notation as “regrettably [...] a greatly diverging
system of denotation”, and compared him to those who “persist in still using sailing ships
whilst steamboats have already been invented, constructed and are waiting at their service.”
(Schro¨der 1898, 61) For historical details about Schro¨der’s general view on logical notations,
see e.g. Peckhaus (1991). For discussion of Peano’s notation, see Quine (1987). More recently,
Frege’s notation has been discussed in Belluci et al. (2018) and Schlimm (2018).
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discern here again Peano’s conviction, which would later become more definitely
articulated, that one should strive to make notations more uniform across sci-
ence. In his responses, Frege emphatically rejected Peano’s evaluation of the
Begriffsschrift from the scientific point of view, as less “penetrating” than that
of the Formulario (Frege 1896a, 1896b). Surprisingly, however, Frege chose not
to respond at all to Peano’s evaluation of the Begriffsschrift from the practical
point of view, as “obscure”, i.e., as making the properties of conjunction and
disjunction less perspicuous than other systems of notation (Frege 1896b, 32).
It’s fair to say that Frege was rather unconcerned with practical matters such
as increasing the uniformity of logical notations, and thought that the episte-
mological benefits of his notation would simply outweigh any possible practical
costs with its assimilation and dissemination within the logic community. As is
well-known, he was too optimistic in this regard.
Before Peano, Schro¨der had strongly criticized the diagrammatic notation
in the Begriffsschrift as impractical, and more particularly, he dismissed what
he perceived as Frege’s alleged analogy between the diagrammatic notation and
the usual arithmetical notation: “it must be said that Frege’s Begriffsschrift
promises too much in its title – or more precisely, that the title does not cor-
respond at all to the content. [...] In the subtitle [...] I find the very point
in which the book corresponds least to its advertised program. [...] If, to the
impartial eye, the ‘modelling’ appears to consist of nothing more than using
letters in both cases, then it seems to me this does not sufficiently justify the
epithet used.” (Schro¨der 1880, 221) Thus, according to Schro¨der, the fact that
letters are used in both arithmetic and the Begriffsschrift is not enough to make
the former a notational model for the latter.
Frege, of course, had meant the modeling in a different sense: “That [the
Begriffsschrift ] is modeled upon the formula language of arithmetic, as I indi-
cated in the title, has to do with fundamental ideas rather than with details of
execution (Einzelgestaltung). [...] The most immediate point of contact between
my formula language and that of arithmetic is the way in which the letters are
employed.” (Frege 1879, 6) So the fundamental idea is not that letters are em-
ployed, but how they are employed. How, more exactly, are letters employed?
Frege’s view appears to be the following: “I adopt the fundamental idea of
distinguishing two kinds of signs [...] those whereby one can represent various
things, and those that have a completely determined meaning. The former are
the letters, and these are to serve mainly for the expression of generality.” (Frege
1879, 10sq) This suggests that the kind of modeling that Frege had in mind is
based on the use of letters as variables. But then, as Schro¨der correctly pointed
out, since the Boolean notation also uses letters for the expression of generality,
Frege’s criterion would not be enough to distinguish his logical notation.
The point that Schro¨der missed here is, of course, that the fundamental ideas
that Frege referred to are not related to the use of letters as variables, but to his
reduction of arithmetical ordering to logical consequence, a reduction that he
motivated in the following way: “We divide all truths that require justification
into two kinds, those for which the proof can be carried out purely by means
of logic and those for which it must be supported by facts of experience. [...]
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Now, when I came to consider the question to which of these two kinds the
judgments of arithmetic belong, I first had to ascertain how far one could proceed
in arithmetic by means of inferences alone, with the sole support of those laws of
thought that transcend all particulars. My initial step was to attempt to reduce
the concept of ordering in a sequence to that of logical consequence, so as to
proceed from there to the concept of number. [...] This [...] led me to the idea of
the present Begriffsschrift.” (Frege 1879, 5sq) Thus, Frege’s subtitle was justified
by his attempted conceptual reduction of arithmetical ordering in a sequence
to logical consequence. Hence, the modeling was meant as conceptual, rather
than notational (Toader 2004). Notational modeling, motivated by rendering
notations more uniform, did not concern Frege at all.
That Schro¨der missed the point of Frege’s conceptual modeling is quite clear
from the way he concluded his review: “The ‘appendix’ of the Begriffsschrift
concerns ‘Some Topics from a General Theory of Sequences’ and appears very
abstruse – the schemata are ornate with symbols! [...] The ‘sequence’ is charac-
terized only by the fact that a certain kind of advancement (which is otherwise
left general) from one element to another is possible. [...] and the author is
proud of the great generality that is given in this way to the concept of se-
quence. It seems to me, however, that there is absolutely nothing of value in
such a generalization.” (Schro¨der 1880, 230sq.) It should be admitted, however,
that beside their misunderstanding of Frege’s foundational reasons that moti-
vated his notation, Schro¨der and Peano rejected that notation mainly because
of a genuine concern with practical matters. In particular, and this is quite
explicit in Peano’s review, it was a commitment to permanence as a principle
of practical rationality that justified skepticism with respect to a new logical
notation that was so conspicuously dissimilar to other, more familiar notations.
5 Beyond Peano
Peano’s argument, discussed above in section three, in favor of an explicitly
Machian interpretation of permanence as a thought-economical principle of prac-
tical rationality, was reiterated by Hans Hahn in his criticism of the view accord-
ing to which the principle of permanence is in fact logically necessary. The focus
of this section will also be on his further point, that although arbitrariness can-
not be entirely eliminated by insisting on the logical necessity of permanence,
once the choice as to what formal laws to preserve and what to forgo when
extending a mathematical system has been made, nothing else should remain
arbitrary. Hahn discussed this in his review of a widely read book on analy-
sis, Vorlesungen u¨ber Zahlen- und Funktionenlehre, published in 1916 by Alfred
Pringsheim, who was described by Hahn as “the most eminent representative of
the arithmetical school, a school which goes so far in rejecting any geometrical
element in analysis that it even renounces the help of the highly suggestive ge-
ometrical terminology which would make its propositions and proofs easier to
understand.” (Hahn 1919, 66)
Pringsheim had contributed to the same Encyklopa¨die volume that included
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Schubert’s article, discussed by Peano, a text titled Irrationalzahlen und Kon-
vergenz unendlicher Prozesse. This, too, attracted Frege’s attention, who did
not miss a chance to mock Pringsheim for claiming that “the rational numbers
feature as signs that may represent well determined quantities but do not have
to.” (Frege 1903, 83sq.) Frege saw this as yet another expression of the fatal sin
he had seen committed by Hankel and Schubert (and many others): “Clearly,
this author too understands the rational numbers as the kind of figures that are
artificially produced by a writing instrument on a writing surface or by a printing
press.” (Frege 1903, 83sq.) Pringsheim was reporting on a view he attributed to
Weierstrass and Cantor – “a particular formal presentation of irrational num-
bers,” according to which an irrational number “appears rather as a complete,
newly created object, or more concretely with Heine, as a new number sign [...]
with which one can calculate according to specific rules.”16 When mentioning
Eduard Heine, Pringsheim duly quoted him as saying the following: “I take
a purely formal standpoint about the definition (of numbers) insofar as I call
certain tangible signs numbers, so that the existence of these numbers does not
come into question then.”17 But Pringsheim immediately went on to clarify that
these new number-signs should not be considered as standing for any quanti-
ties, and neither should the relations between them be seen as relations between
quantities; rather, they should be seen as merely formal succession relations. He
thought that this explained the sense in which a purely formal extension of the
rational numbers to the irrational ones is to be understood: “In particular, the
concept of rational numbers also undergoes an extension in the sense that they
appear as signs to which initially only a certain succession belongs, and which
well can, although do not have to, represent particular quantities.”18 Unlike
Hankel, Pringsheim thought that a purely formal extension was never at risk
of being considered “eine ho¨chst abstruse und beschwerliche Ku¨nstelei”, even if
no arithmetical interpretation, whereby the new number-signs would come to
stand for quantities, was available or even possible.19 However, it seems fair
to say that since he was merely reporting on views about irrational numbers
that had been propounded by others, it’s not clear to what extent Pringsheim
himself thought, at this time, that Heine’s view was correct.
In his review of Pringsheim’s 1916 book, Hahn would also express doubts
about the apparent identification of numbers and number-signs: “Mr. Pring-
sheim certainly does not take the view that the figure 1 I am now drawing with
16“[...] eine bestimmte formale Darstellung der Irrationalzahlen [...] erscheint vielmehr
als ein fertiges, neu geschaffenes Objekt, oder, noch konkreter nach Heine, als ein neues
Zahlzeichen [...] mit welchem nach bestimmten Regeln gerechnet werden kann.” (Pringsheim
1898, 54)
17“Ich stelle mich bei der Definition (der Zahlen) auf den rein formalen Standpunkt, indem
ich gewisse greifbare Zeichen Zahlen nenne, so dass die Existenz dieser Zahlen also nicht in
Frage steht.” (Pringsheim 1898, 54, n.21)
18“Insbesondere erleidet hierbei also auch der Begriff der rationalen Zahlen eine Erweiterung
in dem Sinne, dass sie als Zeichen erscheinen, denen in erster Linie lediglich eine bestimmte
Succession zukommt, und die wohl bestimmte Quantita¨ten vorstellen ko¨nnen, aber nicht
mu¨ssen.” (Pringsheim 1898, 55)
19See footnote 4 on page 6 above for Pringsheim’s criticism of Hankel on this point.
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ink on paper is a natural number: it is obvious that he does not mean anything
so concrete but something else, though it would not be easy to give a precise for-
mulation to the underlying thought.” (Hahn 1919, 57) Of course, Hahn’s point
that what Pringsheim actually maintained was not clear enough is only slightly
less damaging than Frege’s point that he was simply wrong. But the real points
of contention, as far as Hahn was concerned, were different: “The few points on
which we cannot completely follow the author concern individual questions of a
methodological nature, of which we will only single out one for closer scrutiny,
viz. the so-called principle of permanence.” (Hahn 1919, 61). Before we can
analyze these points, here is what Pringsheim wrote about permanence in his
1916 Vorlesungen: “To establish how these new numbers [i.e., zero, negative,
rational, etc.] are to be ordered or, alternatively, incorporated into the ordered
sequence of already existing numbers and how we are to calculate with them,
we shall make use of the transfer principle which (following Hankel) is usually
(but not very felicitously) called the principle of ‘permanence’, and we shall
make use of it in what I regard as a notably improved form which bestows on it
the character of a certain logical necessity. For in every case we shall introduce
new number signs, but only to such an extent that a subset of them represents
signs for already existing numbers. The latter are therefore already governed by
certain rules establishing their succession and defining the arithmetical opera-
tions for them, and these rules can without further ado be transferred into the
new notation. If we are not to allow complete confusion in the manipulation
of the total supply of newly created signs, we have hardly any choice but to
extend the rules already governing part of it to the totality by definition, and
to legitimize this step by proving that the stipulations we have made satisfy the
requirements to be met by them without contradiction.”20 Following his contri-
bution to the Encyklopa¨die, Pringsheim considered the extension of a number
system in a purely formal sense: he took the new number signs to have no in-
terpretation, no reference to quantities, and the relations between them to be
merely succession relations. Only some of the new signs are interpretable, since
they can stand for numbers in the unextended system, but Pringsheim consid-
ered also this subset of the new signs as uninterpreted, and took the relations
between them as formal succession relations. Based on this view of what it is to
extend a number system, he argued that the formal rules that hold for the sub-
set must be preserved or transferred to the entire set of new number signs, lest
“complete confusion” be the outcome. This suggests that, according to him, if
one dropped any rules, the formal succession relations between the new number
signs could not be established, and the operations for manipulating these signs
would fail to be properly defined. If this were the case, then calculating with
the new numbers in the extended system would be logically impossible, which
would defeat the very purpose of extension.
Against this view, Hahn recalled Peano’s criticism of Schubert’s attempt to
formulate permanence precisely: “Peano has demonstrated convincingly that
this attempt is a failure: According to Schubert, the principle of permanence
20Pringsheim (1916, VIIsq), quoted from the English translation of Hahn (1919, 61sq).
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requires that the extensions of the number domain be carried out in such a way
‘that numbers in the extended sense are governed by the same rules as numbers
in the non-extended sense’. But this requirement cannot possibly be met. If
it was really the case that numbers in the extended sense were still governed
by the same rules, then they could not be distinguished from numbers in the
non-extended sense, and we should not then be presented with an extension of
the number domain. Hence it cannot be required that all propositions of the
original number domain continue to hold in the extended domain; the most that
can be required is that the most important propositions continue to hold. But
what the most important propositions are is a matter of personal judgement.
The principle of permanence thereby ceases to be logical in nature and becomes
at best a piece of methodological advice containing within itself an element of
arbitrariness.” (Hahn 1919, 62) Unlike Peano, Hahn appears to have misread
Schubert’s formulation of the principle of permanence: the third part of that
formulation, which we have seen above, requires that the same propositions that
hold for numbers in the extended sense are provably true for numbers in the
non-extended sense. It does not require, as Hahn had it, that the same rules
that govern the numbers in the extended sense are the same rules that govern
numbers in the non-extended sense. Although similar to Peano’s argument,
Hahn’s version can be reconstructed as follows: (H1) It is not the case that all
propositions that are true in the non-extended number system remain true in
the extended one. (H2) Hence, only the most important propositions must be
preserved. (H3) Thus, the principle of permanence is not a logically necessary
principle.
Whereas Peano had rejected the third part of Schubert’s formulation of the
principle of permanence, by denying that all propositions that are true in an
extended system are provably true in the non-extended one, Hahn justified his
(H1) as follows: if the rules that govern the extended system are the same as
those that govern the non-extended one, then the two systems would be indis-
tinguishable, which undercuts the claim that an extension is actually presented.
Thus, Hahn inferred, it is not the case that all propositions that are true in
the non-extended number system remain true in the extended one. But even if
we take him to mean that the rules of the two systems are actually identical,
Hahn’s justification of (H1) does not fare any better than (and for the same
reason noted when we discussed) Peano’s justification of (P1) in his own argu-
ment. However, if one grants Hahn the justification for (H1), then qualifying
the principle of permanence as suggested by his (H2) seems well motivated.
The demand that only the most important propositions must be preserved was
enough for Hahn to infer (H3), that the principle of permanence is not logically
necessary, but is rather arbitrary.
However, Hahn did not follow Peano in thinking that permanence should,
therefore, be reconceived as a thought-economical principle of practical ratio-
nality. He considered that “there is more to be done than just insisting on the
arbitrariness, that what is in question is not only an element of arbitrariness
but also an element of lawfulness which must in turn be brought out into the
open.” (Hahn 1919, 63) These two elements, Hahn added “cooperate in the
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usual extensions of the number domain [but] are not as sharply separated as
they might be.” (Hahn 1919, 63) Thus, in contrast to Peano, Hahn maintained
that the source of arbitrariness should be determined more precisely. For he
argued that even if permanence were a logically necessary principle, universally
valid and applicable to all rules of the non-extended system, as Pringsheim took
it to be, logical arbitrariness would still not be completely eliminated. Moreover,
if one assumed that, when extending a system, once one decided what is the set
of most important propositions to be preserved, all logical arbitrariness would
subsequently disappear, and its place would be entirely taken by lawfulness, i.e.,
all other propositions in the extended system would follow logically from that
set, one would simply be making a false assumption.
Here is Hahn’s argument. Following Pringsheim, let us consider the formal
extension of the natural numbers by positive rational numbers. Introduce a set
of entirely new signs for positive rational numbers, and let a subset of them be
new signs for natural numbers. Let us distinguish “proper” fractions (whose
numerators are not multiples of their denominators) from “improper” fractions
(whose numerators are multiples of their denominators). In order to proceed
with the extension, one must transfer the formal rules for improper fractions
(which are just the “direct consequences” of the rules for natural numbers) to the
proper fractions, thereby establishing the formal succession relations between
proper fractions and defining the basic operations for them. This allows us to
take proper fractions as signs for positive rational numbers, and it allows us to
calculate with them. But this can be achieved, Hahn argued, only if the formal
rules for improper fractions can be extended so as to define equality between
proper fractions in the same way as equality between improper ones, that is,
b
a =
b′
a′ iff ba
′ − ab′ = 0.
If the extension of the natural numbers proceeded along these lines, and
if equality could be uniquely defined as above, then “all arbitrariness would
be excluded” (Hahn 1919, 64). But Hahn denied that Pringsheim’s account
of extension can guarantee the complete elimination of arbitrariness. For he
correctly maintained that equality between improper fractions is not uniquely
defined. As he put it, “we have just as much right to express” equality between
improper fractions, for example, in the following way:
b
a =
b′
a′ iff (ba
′ − ab′)2 + (ra(b)− ra′(b′))2 = 0,
where ra(b) and ra′(b
′) are the absolutely smallest residues of b and b’ to
moduli a and a’, respectively. For improper fractions, these are equivalent defi-
nitions of equality because (ra(b)− ra′(b′)) is always zero, but when transferred
to proper fractions this may not always be zero, so the two definitions are not
equivalent any longer. This entails, according to Hahn, that there is more than
one logically possible way of extending the natural numbers to positive ratio-
nals: “If it were true that the domain of numbers could only be extended by
assuming that [the first definition of equality] continued to hold, we should have
just as much right to make the same assumption about [the second definition of
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equality]. But this would lead to an entirely different definition of equality for
improper fractions. Therefore it is evidently not the case that we may conclude
without further ado that [the first definition of equality] gives us the only possi-
ble definition of equality for improper fractions. And if we prefer the definition
of equality given us by [the first definition of equality] to the one given us by
[the second definition of equality], which in and by itself is just as possible, it is
not, it seems, because we are under a logical compulsion. Again, arbitrariness
seems to reign supreme.” (Hahn 1919, 64)
While he further noted that practical considerations like “realizability and
applicability” (Hahn 1919, 71, n.14) may sometimes justify our preferences as to
one logically possible extension of a number system over another, Hahn argued
that, in the case of positive rational numbers, uniqueness of extension can be
recovered if one stipulates that the basic operations must be one-to-one [ein-
deutig umkehrbar ] mappings (Verknu¨pfungen). Hence, the task as he saw it:
“the system of natural numbers is to be extended by adding new ‘numbers’ in
such a way that multiplication [and thus division] will always be one-to-one in
the extended system.” (Hahn 1919, 63)
Here is how that stipulation works. Consider the extended system of positive
rational numbers, including division and multiplication as basic operations. In
order to show, for any proper fractions ba and
b′
a′ , that their equality can be
uniquely defined, assume ba =
b′
a′ . Since multiplication is assumed one-to-one,
we then have ba (aa
′) = b
′
a′ (aa
′), but because multiplication is associative and
commutative, we have ( baa)a
′ = ( b
′
a′ a
′)a, and thus ba′ = ab′. Conversely, assume
that ba′ = ab′. Since division is one-to-one, we have ba′(aa ) = ab
′(a
′
a′ ), and
because division is associative and commutative, ba (aa
′) = b
′
a′ (aa
′) and finally,
b
a =
b′
a′ . Thus, if the basic operations for proper fractions are taken to be one-
to-one mappings, then uniqueness is restored and logical arbitrariness is fully
eliminated by means of exclusively logical (rather than practical) considerations.
6 Conclusion
I have focused on Peano’s argument for his conception of the principle of perma-
nence as a principle of practical rationality — a Machian conception, driven by
the ideal of thought economy, that Peano believed motivated Burali-Forti and
Marcolongo’s notational project for vectorial calculus, and that he also sum-
moned against Frege’s diagrammatic notation for logic. Unlike earlier mathe-
maticians, such as Peacock and Hankel, who considered the principle of perma-
nence a principle of theoretical rationality, since it was meant to guarantee the
arithmetical interpretability and thus the meaningfulness of symbolic algebra
and formal mathematics, Peano thought that its less than universal validity
made it an arbitrary principle, which he further thought implied that it could
only be understood as a principle of practical rationality, especially relevant in
the selection of more familiar and uniform notations. Insistence on its logical
necessity, by mathematicians like Schubert and Pringsheim, led Hahn to revive
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Peano’s argument, and to identify a further source of arbitrariness, the elimina-
tion of which, as Hahn pointed out, requires further logical considerations.
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